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II.-264 
RISKY BUSINESS: THE ELEVENTH 
CIRCUIT APPLIES SPOKEO TO ASSESS THE 
SUFFICIENCY OF RISK FOR ARTICLE III 
STANDING IN MURANSKY V. GODIVA 
CHOCOLATIER, INC. 
Abstract: On October 4, 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit granted the appellants in Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. a re-
hearing en banc. As a result, the court vacated its original holding that violating 
the truncation requirement in the Fair and Accurate Transactions Act of 2003 re-
sults in a concrete injury for the purposes of standing. The requirement forbids 
merchants from printing more than the last five digits of a credit card number on 
a point-of-sale receipt. In its original decision, the Eleventh Circuit demonstrated 
an unwillingness to override congressional findings that merchants who fail to 
truncate card numbers expose cardholders to an unacceptable risk of identity 
theft. This Comment argues that the court’s original decision was consistent with 
FACTA’s legislative purpose and should be upheld on rehearing. 
INTRODUCTION 
With a valid credit card number, it takes an average of four seconds for a 
hacker to access a cardholder’s full account information, including the expira-
tion date, the card verification value (CVV) number, and billing address.1 In 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Mohammed Aamir Ali et al., Does the Online Card Payment Landscape Unwittingly Facilitate 
Fraud?, 15 INST. OF ELECTRICAL & ELECTRONIC ENGINEERS SECURITY & PRIVACY 78, 80–82 
(2017) (discussing how security flaws in the online payment system permit hackers to extract key 
credit information for fraudulent purchases and money transfers). A credit card number is a unique 
identifier that links a credit card to the cardholder’s bank account. Id. at 79. A cardholder’s account in-
formation is often the only means guarding against fraudulent payments and cash transfers in card-not-
present (CNP) transactions in which a merchant must use means other than physical verification to estab-
lish a cardholder’s identity. Id. Without the standardization of data formats and the centralization of pro-
cessing identity verification for online CNP transactions, hackers can use website bots and automated 
scripts to quickly and correctly guess key account information across different web merchants. Id. at 80–
82. Obtaining a valid credit card number is the starting point to exploiting this system. Id. at 79–80. The 
Federal Trade Commission recognized the value of credit card numbers to fraudsters when the provisions 
in the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) became effective. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, DIV. OF CONSUMER & BUS. EDUC., FTC BUSINESS 
ALERT: SLIP SHOWING? FEDERAL LAW REQUIRES ALL BUSINESSES TO TRUNCATE CREDIT CARD IN-
FORMATION ON RECEIPTS (2007), http://www.reacttf.org/ftcdoc/alt007.pdf (alerting business owners to 
FACTA truncation requirements). By 2017, more than 50% of the $25 billion in global losses to credit 
card fraud was attributable to CNP transactions, while accounting for only 15% of all card purchases and 
cash withdrawals. 1142 HSN CONSULTANTS INC., THE NILSON REPORT 9 (2018), https://nilsonreport.
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the early 2000s, Congress saw that credit card numbers were increasingly fall-
ing into the wrong hands, exposing consumers to a growing risk of identity 
theft and fraud.2 In response, lawmakers passed the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA).3 FACTA includes a provision that prohib-
its merchants from printing more than five digits of a cardholder’s credit or 
debit card number on a receipt provided at the point of sale (the five-digit trun-
cation).4 Any merchant who willfully violates this requirement is liable to the 
cardholder for statutory damages, even if the cardholder suffers only an in-
creased risk, but no actual identity theft.5 
To successfully sue a merchant for FACTA violations, however, plaintiffs 
must first have standing—a legal doctrine determining who can have a court 
decide the merits of their case.6 Plaintiffs must allege that the defendant’s ac-
tions caused an “injury-in-fact” and that the court can provide remedy by issu-
ing them a favorable decision.7 An injury-in-fact is a harm that meets three 
elements thereby conferring Article III standing.8 First, it must be “actual or 
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical,” meaning a plaintiff must have al-
ready suffered or will soon suffer the injury barring the court’s intervention.9 
Second, it must be “particularized,” or in other words, the injury must impact 
                                                                                                                           
com/publication_newsletter_archive_issue.php?issue=1142 [https://perma.cc/72BM-T5C2] (reporting 
on the statistics from the global card and mobile payment industry). 
 2 See H.R. DOC. NO. 106-70, at 1 (2000) (statement of Rep. James A. Leach, Chairman, H. 
Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (expressing concern that hackers, as well as dumpster divers seeking discarded 
credit card receipts, were obtaining valid credit card numbers and using those numbers to steal cardhold-
ers’ identities and make fraudulent transactions).  
 3 See Fair and Accurate Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2018) (provid-
ing congressional findings and FACTA’s statement of purpose); H.R. DOC. NO. 108-47, at 1–2 (2003) 
(statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.) (explaining that FACTA 
reauthorizes the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and highlighting new provisions meant to reduce 
identity theft and fraud). 
 4 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). To “truncate” means to cut short by removing the end. Truncate, 
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 
(3d ed. 1986). 
 5 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (providing that those who willfully violate provisions in FACTA may be 
held liable for statutory damages of between $100 and $1000 or for actual damages that the cardholder 
sustained). 
 6 See Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 154–55 (1990) (describing the standing doctrine); 
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPAL AND POLICIES 58–62 (Richard A. Epstein 
et al. eds., 5th ed. 2015) (defining standing and its requirements). 
 7 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992); see CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 61 
(explaining the definition of standing and its requirements of injury, causation, and redressability). 
The standing doctrine originates from Article III of the United States Constitution, which grants the 
federal judiciary the power to adjudicate only cases and controversies. See U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2 
(conferring judicial power to federal courts and describing the limits of their authority); Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 560 (describing standing as a fundamental component of the case-or-controversy requirement); 
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 59–60 (describing the values standing serves).  
 8 See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (describing the three elements of an injury-in-fact). 
 9 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo), 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016); Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
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the plaintiff in some personal and individual way.10 Lastly, it must be concrete, 
or simply put, the injury must be “real, and not abstract.”11 Yet, FACTA pro-
vides a private right of action for procedural violations without requiring plain-
tiffs to show any physical harm or monetary damages.12 The question splitting 
federal circuit courts—and the focus of this Comment—is thus whether violat-
ing FACTA creates enough risk of identity theft such that the harm is “real” or 
concrete as defined in the standing doctrine.13 
In 2019, in Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. (Muransky II), the Elev-
enth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff sufficiently alleged a concrete injury, 
but it subsequently vacated its decision and granted the appellants a rehearing 
en banc.14 The plaintiff, Dr. David Muransky, claimed to have suffered a 
heightened risk of identity theft when, following a Visa card purchase at a Go-
diva boutique, he received a printed receipt bearing the first six and last four 
digits of his credit card number, in violation of FACTA’s five-digit truncation 
requirement.15 Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the legal and 
factual background to Muransky II.16 Part II analyzes the Eleventh Circuit’s 
discussion and how its ruling departed from those of other circuits.17 Part III 
argues that courts should defer to congressional judgment in truncation cases 
and that the Eleventh Circuit should rule consistently with its original decision 
on rehearing.18 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 11 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 12 15 U.S.C. § 1681n. A private right of action is an individual’s right to personally seek judicial 
relief to remedy a violation of the law. Private Right of Action, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019). 
 13 See Elizabeth C. Pritzker, Making the Intangible Concrete: Litigating Intangible Privacy 
Harms in a Post-Spokeo World, 26 COMPETITION J. ANTITRUST, UCL & PRIVACY SEC. ST. BOARD 
CAL. 1, 3 (2017) (framing the issue of standing in privacy-related cases and noting the divergence of 
opinions at the circuit-court level). Compare Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. (Muransky II), 
922 F.3d 1175, 1188 (11th Cir.), reh’g granted, 939 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019) (concluding that a 
heightened risk of identity theft is an injury sufficiently concrete to confer standing), with Kamal v. J. 
Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 113 (3d Cir. 2019) (concluding that the plaintiff did not suffer a con-
crete injury for the purposes of standing when alleging solely a heightened risk of identity theft). See 
generally Pritzker, supra, at 3–9 (outlining the approaches circuit courts have taken on standing in 
privacy-related cases generally, not limited to FACTA truncation cases).  
 14 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1188. 
 15 Id. at 1181; see also Complaint at 6, Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. (Muransky I), No. 
0:15-cv-60716-WPD, slip op. at 6–7 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2016) (providing further details on Muran-
sky’s factual allegations). 
 16 See infra notes 19–68 and accompanying text. 
 17 See infra notes 69–87 and accompanying text. 
 18 See infra notes 88–110 and accompanying text. 
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I. LEGAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF MURANSKY 
In 2019, in Muransky II, the Eleventh Circuit held that violating FACTA’s 
truncation requirement created enough risk of identity theft to establish stand-
ing for plaintiffs to sue.19 The court subsequently vacated its decision and 
granted the appellants a rehearing en banc.20 Section A of this Part describes 
the legal context behind the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion.21 Section B provides a 
factual and procedural history of the case.22 
A. Legal Background 
The question of standing asks who has the legal right to challenge anoth-
er’s conduct in court.23 In 1992, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme 
Court held that a plaintiff must have suffered an “injury-in-fact”—a harm suf-
ficient to confer standing—to sue in federal court.24 Through legislation, Con-
gress can define rights, and when deprived of those rights, plaintiffs may have 
standing, even if they would not have suffered a harm in absence of the stat-
ute.25 FACTA is one such piece of legislation.26 The Act prohibits merchants 
from printing more than the last five digits of consumers’ credit card numbers 
and requires them to fully mask the expiration dates on receipts at the point of 
sale.27 FACTA gives cardholders the ability to sue merchants who willfully 
violate its provisions for statutory damages without requiring the cardholders 
to show that their identity was in fact stolen.28 It thereby creates a previously 
non-existent right—the right to expect merchants to follow certain procedures 
                                                                                                                           
 19 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1188. 
 20 Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. (Muransky III), 939 F.3d 1278, 1279 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 21 See infra notes 23–57 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 58–68 and accompanying text. 
 23 See Whitmore, 495 U.S. at 154–55 (explaining that the United States Constitution allows feder-
al courts to adjudicate only “cases and controversies,” and the standing doctrine identifies which dis-
putes fall within the meaning of these words); Standing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12 
(defining standing). 
 24 See 504 U.S. at 560 (noting that Article III standing requires, at a minimum, that plaintiffs 
show they suffered an injury-in-fact traceable to the defendant’s conduct and redressable by judicial 
decision). 
 25 See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 513–14 (1975) (explaining that Congress may confer a 
statutory right that, when violated, creates harm that the courts will recognize as an injury-in-fact). 
 26 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681n (providing that those who willfully violate provisions in FACTA may 
be held liable for statutory damages of between $100 and $1000 or for actual damages that the card-
holder sustained). 
 27 Id. § 1681c(g)(1) (defining the truncation requirements). 
 28 See id. § 1681n(a)(1)(A) (providing for statutory damages for willful violations of FACTA); 
Warth, 422 U.S. at 513–14 (explaining how violations of statutory rights can also be sufficient to 
demonstrate an injury-in-fact for standing purposes). Willful noncompliance includes both knowingly 
and recklessly violating a statute. See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 56–57 (2007) 
(holding that the common-law usage of the term “willfully” includes knowing and reckless disregard 
of the law). 
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safeguarding consumer identity.29 When violating FACTA truncation require-
ments, merchants harm cardholders by depriving them of this right.30 
Yet, what harms qualify to confer standing is not merely a matter of what 
occurred, but also a question of what courts recognize as injury-in-fact.31 The 
Court in Lujan held that judicially cognizable harms must be “concrete and 
particularized,” as well as “actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothet-
ical.” 32 Although a harm may arise out of a statutory violation, the inquiry 
does not end there.33 A plaintiff must have already suffered or will imminently 
                                                                                                                           
 29 See Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1188 (noting that, in passing the FACTA truncation requirement, 
Congress imposed on merchants a procedural requirement designed to protect consumers from identi-
ty theft). 
 30 See id. (concluding that when the defendant violated the five-digit truncation requirement, the 
plaintiff could no longer expect that the merchant followed procedures enacted to prevent the theft of 
consumer identity). 
 31 Daniel Townsend, Note, Who Should Define Injuries for Article III Standing?, 68 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 76, 77–78 (2015), http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/3/2015/
12/68_Stan_L_Rev_Online_76_Townsend.pdf (explaining the concept of injury-in-fact). Judge Wil-
liam A. Fletcher, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, recounted a helpful anecdote 
illustrating the difference between an injury as commonly understood and an injury that confers stand-
ing in the eyes of the law. Id. at 78. He told his younger daughter, Leah, who was upset because Judge 
Fletcher and his wife gave her older sister, Anne, a new bike, that Anne receiving the bike did not 
cause Leah injury. Id. But, Leah was hurt—just not in a way that the family chose to recognize as 
legitimate. Id. Analogously, when a court determines which injuries it chooses to recognize, the defi-
nition of injury is no longer based on reality, but is instead rooted in its legitimacy under the law. See 
id. at 78 (explaining how injury-in-fact differs from the common conception of injury using Judge 
Fletcher’s example). 
 32 504 U.S. at 560. In contexts unrelated to statutory provisions on privacy, the Supreme Court 
has held that an injury is concrete when plaintiffs suffer harm to a judicially cognizable interest. See 
id. at 566–67 (holding that those who worked with and studied endangered animals suffered a con-
crete injury when federal action threatened those animals, because they had a judicially cognizable 
interest in the continued existence of their objects of study); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 756 
(1984) (explaining that one of the injuries the plaintiffs alleged was concrete because a policy of seg-
regation harmed the judicially cognizable interest of securing their children’s access to racially inte-
grated schools); Warth, 422 U.S. at 514 (holding that a statute can create a judicially cognizable inter-
est, harm to which would constitute a concrete injury). What qualifies as a judicially cognizable inter-
est is case-specific and lacks a general rule. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 6, at 71, 77. Compare Lujan, 
504 U.S. at 566–67 (holding the wish to observe an animal species to be a judicially cognizable inter-
est), and Int’l Primate Prot. League v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72, 77 (1991) (holding 
that the right to sue in one’s chosen forum is a judicially cognizable interest), with Allen, 468 U.S. at 
755–56 (holding that the desire to be free of stigma is not an interest the Court recognizes), and Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 128 (1973) (holding that marital satisfaction is not a judicially cognizable inter-
est). 
 33 See Gladstone Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100 (1979) (emphasizing that, even 
if Congress can define harms, it cannot do away with the minimum requirements for constitutional 
standing, such that a plaintiff must always have suffered concrete and redressable injury); see also 
Peter C. Ormerod, A Private Enforcement Remedy for Information Misuse, 60 B.C. L. REV. 1893, 
1920 (2019) (arguing that the Supreme Court holds in tension two conflicting conclusions: on the one 
hand, the Constitution empowers Congress to pass laws defining injuries-in-fact, and on the other, 
Congress’s exercise of that power can, at times, violate Article III requirements for standing). 
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suffer the harm for the court to adjudicate the dispute.34 The harm must also be 
particularized, meaning it must impact the plaintiff in an individualized and 
personal manner.35 And, the harm must be concrete, or in other words, it must 
be “real and not abstract.”36 
In 2016, in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, a privacy-related class action lawsuit 
alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), the Supreme 
Court provided new guidance for cases in which statutory violations placed 
plaintiffs at risk for intangible harms.37 Spokeo, Inc., a consumer reporting 
agency, had disseminated inaccurate consumer reports to Thomas Robins’s 
potential employers.38 Robins brought a class action lawsuit in federal district 
court claiming that Spokeo violated FCRA by failing to establish procedures 
that would have prevented the publication of inaccurate reports.39 The district 
court dismissed the case for failure to allege an injury-in-fact, and Robins ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.40 The Ninth 
Circuit reversed, holding that Robins adequately pled an injury-in-fact when he 
alleged that Spokeo violated a statutory right affecting his personal interests.41 
On review, the Supreme Court agreed that Robins suffered a personal harm 
when Spokeo disseminated inaccurate information to his potential employers.42 
Nonetheless, the Court remanded the case for the Ninth Circuit to reconsider 
standing because the lower court’s analysis addressed only whether Robin’s 
harm was particularized but not whether it was concrete.43 
                                                                                                                           
 34 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 35 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 36 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548; Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 37 See Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (2018) (stating the need 
for procedures ensuring “fair and accurate credit reporting”); Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548 (emphasizing 
the necessity of a separate concreteness analysis for the purposes of standing). 
 38 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1546. 
 39 Complaint at 2–3, Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Robins I), No. CV10–05306 ODW(AGRx), 2011 
WL 597867 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2011). Spokeo, Inc. ran a search engine where users could look up a 
person’s photograph and personal information, such as age, educational and professional background, 
marital status, and economic health. Id. at 5. Robins alleged that Spokeo violated FCRA by posting a 
photograph of him under his profile that was not, in fact, him. Id.; see 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (requiring 
consumer reporting agencies to reasonably ensure consumer reports are published with “maximum 
possible accuracy”). He was also incorrectly listed as a married man in the top ten percent of wealth 
and employed in a technical field with strong academic credentials. Complaint, supra, at 5. In fact, he 
was single, unemployed and actively seeking work. Id. He alleged that Spokeo harmed his job pro-
spects by making him seem overqualified, with higher salary expectations, and less mobile as a result 
of familial obligations. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1555. 
 40 See Robins I, 2011 WL 597867, at *2 (dismissing the case for lack of standing); Notice of 
Appeal at 2, Robins I, 2011 WL 597867. 
 41 Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Robins II), 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 42 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548, 1550. 
 43 Id. Because of the novel and intangible nature of identity-theft risk, privacy-related statutory 
violations required a new test to balance standing’s injury-in-fact requirement with Congress’s intent 
to confer a broad private right of action. See Pritzker, supra note 12, at 1 (2017) (discussing the impe-
tus for clarity on the concreteness question prior to Spokeo). 
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To start, the Court held that, although a judicially cognizable harm must 
be “real” so as to be concrete, it does not have to be tangible.44 When a harm is 
intangible, like one arising from the release of inaccurate personal information 
to prospective employers, courts should consider two factors.45 The first factor 
examines whether the alleged harm resembles a violation of a right historically 
entitling a person to seek remedy in English or American courts.46 The second 
considers whether Congress intended for plaintiffs to have standing if they suf-
fered the harm.47 The Court proceeded to emphasize that, despite these consid-
erations, alleging a mere deprivation of procedural rights would still fail to 
meet Article III requirements for standing.48 Procedural rights give parties the 
ability to require that others follow certain rules, but not the right to an end 
result.49 A procedural violation confers standing only if it results in a risk of 
harm sufficiently elevated so as to be concrete.50 
In Spokeo, the Supreme Court reasoned that the harm from disseminating 
inaccurate personal information has common-law analogs in libel and defama-
tion that characterize the publishing of slanderous material as an injury sufficient 
to establish a plaintiff’s standing without proof of actual damages.51 And, the 
Court recognized that the FCRA’s legislative history clearly indicated congres-
sional intent to provide plaintiffs a private right of action.52 The FCRA, however, 
provided a procedural right granting Robins the right to sue when Spokeo failed 
to implement procedures for accurate reporting.53 It did not give Robins the right 
to demand that consumer reporting agencies only release personal reports with 
                                                                                                                           
 44 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 45 See id. (explaining that courts must weigh history and congressional intent when evaluating an 
intangible harm). 
 46 Id. Because the doctrine of standing finds its roots in the case-or-controversy requirement in 
Article III of the Constitution, the Court drew on historical practice to inform its analysis of intangible 
harms. Id. 
 47 Id. This factor acknowledges that through legislation, Congress can identify new harms estab-
lishing standing when, prior to a statute’s passage, courts would not recognize such harms as injuries-
in-fact. Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Devin Mc Dougall, Note, Reconciling Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and Massachusetts v. 
EPA on the Set of Procedural Rights Eligible for Relaxed Article III Standing, 37 COLUM. J. ENVTL. 
L. 151, 156 (2012). 
 50 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. 
 51 See Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Robins III), 867 F.3d 1108, 1114–15 (9th Cir. 2017) (concluding 
that the inaccurate dissemination of Robins’s personal information was similar to the common-law 
torts of libel and defamation). The judicially cognizable interest, in this case, was the right to privacy 
and reputation. See id. (explaining that FCRA protects interests historically recognized in the law). To 
commit libel is to disparage a person on false grounds using a fixed format, especially in writing, 
while defamation includes both written and oral statements of disparagement. Defamation, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 12; Libel, id. 
 52 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. 
 53 See id. at 1545 (describing provisions in Section 1681e(b) of the FCRA). 
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correct information.54 Some inaccurate publications, such as an incorrect zip 
code, do not create a high risk of harm to a plaintiff’s reputation.55 For the Court, 
the question thus became whether the misinformation exposed Robins to a risk 
of reputational harm sufficient enough to be concrete.56 It therefore remanded 
the case for the Ninth Circuit for a determination on this issue.57 
B. Factual Background 
In Muransky II, the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a consumer had 
standing when alleging that Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. violated FACTA’s five-
digit truncation requirement.58 Following a purchase at a Godiva store in March 
2015, Dr. David Muransky received a receipt displaying his credit card number’s 
first six and last four digits.59 He then brought a class action lawsuit against Go-
diva, alleging willful violations of FACTA provisions that exposed him and the 
class to a heightened risk of identity theft.60 In September 2015, the District 
Court for the Southern District of Florida denied Godiva’s motion to dismiss.61 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (providing no bar on publishing inaccurate reports). 
 55 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. On remand, the Ninth Circuit held that Robins’s alleged harms were sufficiently concrete 
for Article III standing. Robins III, 867 F.3d at 1118. First, the court considered whether the procedur-
al rights in the FCRA guard against concrete harms. Id. at 1114–15. It concluded that his alleged harm 
was sufficiently analogous to harm that would traditionally serve as the basis for a lawsuit alleging 
privacy violations or defamation. Id. at 1114. It also held that Congress recognized that dissemination 
of false information alone can constitute a concrete harm because the legislative record warned exten-
sively about the real-life implications of errors in consumer reports. Id. at 1115. Second, because the 
FCRA’s procedural rights guard against concrete harms, the court next considered with Spokeo placed 
Robins in enough risk of harm to confer standing. Id. Although Spokeo inflated Robins’s credentials 
in the reports it released to his potential employers, the court noted that errors inaccurately stating a 
candidate’s skills and education level, even for the better, could hurt employment chances. Id. at 1117. 
As a result, it held that Robins suffered a risk of harm sufficient to be a concrete injury and remanded 
the case to the district court for a finding consistent with its ruling. Id. at 1118. The Ninth Circuit did 
not examine the question of standing for the other members of the class action. Id. The defendant 
appealed, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Order List at 3, 583 U.S. 17-806 (2018) (order 
denying certiorari). The case went back to the district court, and after settlement negotiations, both 
parties filed for voluntary dismissal, which the district court granted. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc. (Robins 
IV), No. CV10–05306 ODW(AGRx), slip op. at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2019); Stipulation for Dismis-
sal with Prejudice, Robins IV, slip op. at *2. 
 58 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1181; see also Complaint at 6, Muransky I, No. 0:15-cv-60716-WPD 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2016) (detailing Muransky’s factual allegations). 
 59 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1181. 
 60 Id. Dr. Muransky alleged that five-digit truncation violations occurred in all United States Go-
diva retail stores, of which there were over two-hundred, for at least sixty days prior to the filing of 
the complaint on April, 6, 2015. Complaint, supra note 58, at 7. 
 61 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1181; see also Muransky I, No. 0:15-cv-60716-WPD, slip op. at 6–7 
(S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2015) (order denying motion to dismiss first amended complaint). Shortly thereaf-
ter, Godiva admitted that the violations had taken place over the alleged time period but not to the 
number of retail stores. Answer to First Amended Complaint at 9–10, Muransky I, No. 0:15-cv-
60716-WPD (S.D. Fla. Sept. 16, 2015). 
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As the parties approached their third month of discovery, they agreed to media-
tion and reached a settlement.62 Upon receiving an order of preliminary approval 
of the settlement from the district court, 318,000 class members received a no-
tice of the agreement.63 Five class members objected to the settlement.64 At the 
settlement hearing, the opposing class members raised several objections, one of 
which challenged Dr. Muransky’s standing.65 The district court approved the 
class settlement over these objections without deciding on the issue of stand-
ing.66 On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling after 
deciding that Dr. Muransky suffered a risk of identity theft sufficiently elevated 
so as to be a concrete harm for the purposes standing.67 The objector-appellants 
                                                                                                                           
 62 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1181. The parties filed a notice of settlement and motion to stay all 
proceedings on November 20, 2015. Notice of Settlement at 1, Muransky I, No. 0:15-cv-60716-WPD 
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 20, 2015). They agreed to settle for $6.3 million. Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1181. Dr. 
Muransky also applied for an incentive award totaling $10,000. Id. Counsel for the class requested an 
award of attorney’s fees equaling one-third of the settlement or $2.1 million. Id. 
 63 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1182. 47,000 class members submitted claim forms to receive money 
from the settlement fund and only fifteen opted out. Id. 
 64 Id. In their briefs, the opposing class members alleged insufficient notice of the attorney’s fees 
motion per Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h). Id. Rule 23(h) requires notice to be provided in a 
reasonable manner, and the objectors argued that the deadlines for objections to the settlement should 
have been set after counsel filed the attorney’s fees motion. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); Objections to Pro-
posed Settlement at 3, Muransky I, No. 0:15-cv-60716-WPD (S.D. Fla. Aug. 23, 2016). They also 
objected to the amount of Dr. Muransky’s $10,000 incentive award, as well as to his failure to use a 
lodestar analysis to determine whether attorney’s fees were reasonable. Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 
1182. The lodestar analysis is a method of reviewing attorney’s fees for abuse of discretion in a set-
tlement. Purdue v. Kenney A. ex rel. Winn, 559 U.S. 542, 551 (2010). It sets a benchmark by estimat-
ing fees a prevailing attorney would earn on a similar case if paid by the hour. Id. 
 65 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1183. The district court found no procedural violations as to notice 
and did not rule on objections to the incentive award. Muransky I, slip op. at 3. The court declined to 
use the lodestar method because, in cases involving class actions with a common settlement fund, 
circuit precedent required district courts to award attorney’s fees based on a benchmark of approxi-
mately thirty-three percent of the fund with adjustments based on case-specific circumstances. Id. at 5. 
The court concluded that the attorney’s fees were reasonable because they were consistent with other 
fee awards in the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 5. 
 66 See id. at 1–8 (lacking an opinion as to Dr. Muransky’s standing). 
 67 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1185, 1192. The Eleventh Circuit initially issued its holding on Octo-
ber 3, 2018, before vacating sua sponte and replacing it with its later opinion published on April 22, 
2019. Id. at 1180; Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 905 F.3d 1200, 1204 (11th Cir. 2018), va-
cated, 922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir. 2019). In the intervening months, the court received several filings; 
the appellants had petitioned for a rehearing, and Six Flags Entertainment Corporation, as well as 
industry associations, filed amicus briefs in support of that petition. Petition for Rehearing and Re-
hearing En Banc, Muransky, 905 F.3d 1200; Brief for Amicus Curiae Six Flags Entm’t Corp., id.; 
Brief for Amicus Curiae National Retail Federation, id. Six Flags, at the time, had pending litigation, 
facing allegations of five-digit truncation violations in the District Court for the Northern District of 
Georgia. Bailey v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., No. 1:17-CV-3336-MHC, 2019 WL 3503732, at *1 (N.D. 
Ga. 2019). Citing the Eleventh Circuit superseding opinion, a district court judge ultimately denied 
Six Flags’s motion to dismiss. Id. at *2.  
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petitioned for a rehearing en banc, and the Eleventh Circuit granted that motion 
and vacated the panel opinion on October 4, 2019.68 
II. APPLYING THE SPOKEO FRAMEWORK: THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT  
SPLITS WITH THE SECOND, THIRD, AND NINTH CIRCUITS 
Because the truncation requirement is a procedural right under FACTA, 
after the Supreme Court’s 2016 ruling in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the question 
became whether defendants who violated that right exposed plaintiffs to a risk 
of identity theft sufficiently elevated so as to be a concrete harm.69 In 2017, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in Katz v. Donna Karan 
Co., affirmed a district court’s dismissal of a FACTA truncation case for lack 
of standing.70 In Katz, the defendant, a women’s clothing retailer, gave the 
plaintiff a copy of his receipt displaying the first six and last four digits of his 
credit card number.71 The district court concluded that the first six digits of a 
card number establish only the card’s issuer, not the identity of the cardhold-
er.72 Exposing these numbers thus created little risk to the plaintiff who, in 
turn, suffered no concrete harm.73 The Second Circuit found no clear error in 
the district court’s risk assessment, allowing lower courts within its jurisdiction 
to take an ad hoc approach to deciding whether plaintiffs suffered enough risk 
to have standing for violations of FACTA’s procedural requirements.74 Shortly 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Muransky III, 939 F.3d at 1279 (order granting petition for rehearing en banc and vacating 
panel opinion). 
 69 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo) 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549–50 (2016) (explaining that proce-
dural violations are not concrete injuries when there is an insufficient risk of harm to a judicially cog-
nizable interest); e.g., Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 119–21 (2d Cir. 2017) (affirming a 
district court dismissal for lack of standing due to the plaintiff’s insufficient exposure to the risk of 
identity fraud following a credit card truncation violation). FACTA amended the FCRA with the goal 
of reducing identity theft and credit fraud. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2018)); H.R. Doc. No. 108-47, at 
1–2 (2003) (statement of Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, H. Comm. on Fin. Servs.). Prior to 
Spokeo, courts did not assess the sufficiency of risk when determining whether a plaintiff suffered a 
concrete injury for the purposes of standing in FACTA truncation cases. See, e.g., Robins v. Spokeo, 
Inc. (Robins II), 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 2014) (determining that Robins suffered a concrete 
injury because the violation personally affected him); see also Hammer v. Sam’s E., Inc., 754 F.3d 
492, 498–99 (8th Cir. 2014) (concluding that the plaintiffs suffered a concrete injury because the de-
fendants violated their statutory rights).  
 70 872 F.3d at 121. 
 71 Id. at 117. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Id. at 119–21. The court made its decision based on information alleged in the defendant’s motion 
to dismiss and similar findings from other district courts. Id. at 119–20. The court also considered a web 
article attached to the defendant’s brief explaining that the first six digits of a cardholder’s number is 
the card’s Bank or Issuer Identification Number. Id. at 120. 
 74 See id. (concluding that the district court did not clearly err in its risk assessment despite the 
abbreviated fact-finding procedure, while noting that courts in future cases should establish a more 
developed evidentiary basis for their findings). 
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thereafter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took a similar 
approach, affirming a dismissal on comparable facts and procedural history.75 
In its original 2019 opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit, in Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier Inc. (Muransky II), re-
jected the Second and Ninth Circuits’ approach to applying Spokeo.76 For the 
Muransky II court, the FACTA truncation requirement reflected congressional 
findings that printing anything more than the last five digits of a credit card 
number exceeds the acceptable level of identity theft risk.77 The court declined 
to conduct its own risk assessment because it believed Congress possessed a 
superior understanding of the mechanisms behind credit card fraud.78 Accord-
ing to the court, Godiva’s procedural violations exposed Dr. Muransky to a 
level of risk beyond what is tolerable in Congress’s judgment.79 As a result, 
this heightened exposure constituted a concrete harm sufficient to qualify as an 
injury-in-fact for Article III standing.80 
The Muransky II court also declined to infer from later amendments to 
FACTA that Congress intended to limit its private right of action to plaintiffs 
who, in fact, suffered fraud.81 Known as the Clarification Act, the amendment 
provides a grace period between 2004–2007 to merchants who would have 
otherwise been in willful noncompliance for printing the expiration date on 
consumers’ point-of-sale receipts.82 Thus, plaintiffs who allege expiration date 
violations dating back to this period would only have a private right of action 
if they incurred actual damages.83 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit in Kamal v. J. Crew Group, Inc., had affirmed a district court 
                                                                                                                           
 75 See Noble v. Nev. Checker Cab Corp., 726 F. App’x 582, 583–84 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding 
that a plaintiff alleging a violation of FACTA’s five-digit truncation requirement lacked standing 
because printing the first digit of a cardholder’s credit card number poses minimal risk).  
 76 Compare Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. (Muransky II), 922 F.3d 1175, 1189 (11th 
Cir.), reh’g granted, 939 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019) (rejecting the premise that a federal district court 
could, based on its own findings of fact, decide how many digits revealed would result in a sufficient risk 
of harm for the purposes of standing), with Katz, 872 F.3d at 121 (applying Spokeo and deciding that 
the plaintiff did not suffer a sufficient risk of harm to establish standing), and Noble, 726 F. App’x at 
583–84 (same). 
 77 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1187. 
 78 See id. at 1188 (declining to state that, as a matter of law and contrary to Congress’s assess-
ment, the risk of identity theft is not concrete until a merchant prints a number of credit card digits 
greater than the number specified by statute). 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 1188–89. 
 82 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(d). 
 83 See id. (clarifying what conduct constitutes willful noncompliance). The court noted that Con-
gress amended FACTA in 2007 to address the large number of abusive lawsuits against merchants who 
printed the expiration dates of consumer credit cards but otherwise complied with FACTA. Muransky II, 
922 F.3d at 1187; see also Credit and Debit Card Receipt Clarification Act of 2007 (Clarification Act), 
Pub. L. No. 110-241, 122 Stat. 1565, 1566 (2008) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(d)) (stating the pur-
pose of the amendment). 
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decision that a plaintiff lacked standing when a retail clothing store printed the 
first six and last four digits of his credit card number.84 The Third Circuit 
acknowledged that an untruncated expiration date was not at issue, but it never-
theless concluded that by passing the Clarification Act, Congress intended to 
limit any private right of action under FACTA to plaintiffs who suffered actual 
damages.85 The Muransky II court drew the opposite conclusion.86 By leaving 
the five-digit truncation requirement in place, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, 
Congress distinguished the measure from other procedural violations as one that 
plays a more crucial role in protecting consumers from fraud and identity theft.87 
III. THE AFTERMATH OF THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S RULING IN MURANSKY II 
In 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
granted the appellants in Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. (Muransky II) a 
rehearing en banc.88 In doing so, the court vacated its original holding that 
when merchants print more than five digits of a card number on a point-of-sale 
receipt, the cardholder suffers a risk of identity sufficiently elevated so as to be 
a concrete harm for the purposes of standing.89 The Eleventh Circuit in Muran-
sky II had ample reason to place such deference in the legislature, and it should 
therefore rule consistently with its original decision upon rehearing.90 
Congress is uniquely competent to define acceptable levels of risk be-
cause lawmakers are better equipped to develop an evidentiary foundation an-
choring modern conceptions of harm.91 As opposed to the judiciary, the legisla-
                                                                                                                           
 84 Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 107, 120 (3d Cir. 2019).  
 85 Id. at 107 (excerpting language from the Clarification Act and discussing its implications on 
the concreteness analysis). 
 86 See Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1188 (declining to infer from later amendments to FACTA that 
Congress decided to limit the private right of action to only consumers who can allege that hackers in 
fact committed fraud). 
 87 Id. at 1189. Compare id. at 1188–89 (reasoning that, by leaving the requirement in place, Con-
gress specifically determined that five-digit truncation protects consumers from identity theft), with 
Kamal, 918 F.3d at 113 (concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing because he did not show actual 
harm stemming from the violation). The Eleventh Circuit also underscored Congress’s assertions in 
the Clarification Act that the five-digit truncation itself prevents fraud and identity theft. Muransky II, 
922 F.3d at 1188–89. 
 88 Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc. (Muransky II), 922 F.3d 1175, 1181, 1188 (11th Cir.), 
reh’g granted, 939 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 89 Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1181,1188. 
 90 See id. (emphasizing Congress’s greater institutional capacity to define injuries); Kenneth Culp 
Davis, Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Lawmaking: A Proposed Research Service for the 
Supreme Court, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3 (1986) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s relative inability to 
develop a strong evidentiary foundation for its standing opinions results in numerous contradictory 
rulings, thus impairing judge-made law from delivering consistent holdings on similar facts); infra 
notes 92–93 and accompanying text (discussing Congress’s advantages in defining new concepts of 
injuries). 
 91 See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo) 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016) (holding that congressional 
intent is helpful because the legislature is in a good position to identify intangible harms sufficiently 
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ture benefits from the staff, money, and time dedicated to information gather-
ing.92 The judiciary’s fact-finding ability is further hindered because standing 
is a jurisdictional question often answered before discovery.93 As a result, 
                                                                                                                           
concrete for the purposes of standing); Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1188 (underscoring Congress’s insti-
tutional capacity to define concrete injuries for Article III standing); Townsend, supra note 31, at 81–
83 (examining congressional advantages in defining injuries); infra note 92 and accompanying text 
(discussing characteristics that make the legislature well-positioned to define new concepts of inju-
ries). 
 92 Robin Charlow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79 COR-
NELL L. REV. 527, 578 (1994) (discussing the relative advantages to enacting laws by representative 
democracy in the legislature, as opposed to by referenda in a direct democracy, and arguing that even 
judicial review of laws enacted by popular vote do not cure their defects). To enact complex and far-
reaching laws, the legislature relies on a committee system unavailable to the judiciary that allows it 
to develop subject-matter expertise in any particular area of policymaking. Id. at 578 n.195. Congress 
held eighteen hearings on identity theft alone when considering FACTA provisions. REBA BEST, FED-
ERAL IDENTITY THEFT LAW: MAJOR ENACTMENTS OF THE 108TH CONGRESS: A LEGISLATIVE HIS-
TORY OF THE FAIR AND ACCURATE CREDIT TRANSACTIONS ACT AND IDENTITY THEFT PENALTY 
ENHANCEMENT ACT 48–51 (2005). The 115th Congress (2017–2018) had twenty permanent standing 
committees in the House and sixteen in the Senate. CONG. RESEARCH SERV. NO. 99-241, COMMITTEE 
TYPES AND ROLES (2017). In fiscal year 2019, salaries and expenses for standing committees were 
budgeted at over $120 million, and the government allotted over $130 million to Senate inquiries and 
investigations alone. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2019, at 11–12 (2019). Procedurally, unlike the courts, the legislature is not hindered by prohi-
bitions against ex parte communications, stare decisis, or the time constraints of active litigation, nor 
is it limited to the parties’ framings of the issues. Neal Devins, Congressional Fact-finding and the 
Scope of Judicial Review: A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1178–81 (2001) (recognizing 
the numerous procedural advantages that Congress has over courts in pursuing information). Still, 
some commentators contend that legislation can lack strong evidentiary support. See id. at 1182 (argu-
ing that, although lawmakers are equipped with better fact-finding tools, they may lack the incentives 
to seek accurate information); see, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of 
Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 891 (1987) (outlining the economic theory of legislation where, 
instead of voting for the public interest, legislators primarily vote to ensure their reelection). In partic-
ular, lobbyists and special interest groups can, for example, hijack the legislative agenda. See Farber 
& Frickey, supra at 892 (explaining the theory whereby “rent-seeking” interest groups dominate polit-
ical activity). But see id. at 894–95 (finding that empirical evidence does not support the theory that 
special interest groups have had an outsized role in crafting legislation to the detriment of the public’s 
interest). Partisan politics may also prevent legislators from opposing the decisions of agenda-setters 
within their party, even if the evidence is substandard or undermines the legislative actions taken. 
Devins, supra, at 1183–84. 
 93 See Townsend, supra note 31, at 82 (comparing the abilities of Congress and those of the judi-
ciary to define injuries); see e.g. Katz v. Donna Karan Co., 872 F.3d 114, 120–21 (2d Cir. 2017) (con-
cluding that the district court permissibly dismissed the case for lack of standing despite expressing 
reservations about the limited fact-finding procedure available to the court at the motion-to-dismiss 
stage). See generally Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1975) (explaining that standing is a 
requirement plaintiffs must satisfy before federal courts can consider the substantive merits of their 
cases). Challenges to standing may be mounted at any stage of litigation. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wild-
life, 514 U.S. 555, 561 (1992) (establishing that standing is not only required at pleading, but it must 
also be supported with the proof appropriate at different stages of litigation). 
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courts are likely to dismiss cases for lack of standing without being presented 
with all relevant factors bearing on a comprehensive assessment of risk.94 
For instance, the probability of guessing a valid credit card number in-
creases from one chance out of one billion when a card number is properly 
truncated to one out of only one hundred thousand when it is not—a startling 
figure that neither the court in Kamal v. J. Crew Group, Inc. nor the court in 
Katz v. Donna Karen Co. considered in their decisions.95 The Third Circuit in 
Kamal concluded that revealing anything less than the full sixteen-digit card 
number made the risk of identity theft too conjectural for the purposes of 
standing.96 In a similar vein, for the Second Circuit in Katz, because the de-
fendant disclosed ostensibly public information, the plaintiffs suffered no 
higher risk than if the defendants had not violated their procedural rights.97 
Congress, however, created a per se rule leaving little room for judicial 
assessments of risk.98 As a matter of law, defendants are liable when they print 
any more than five digits of a consumer’s credit card number.99 Such a proce-
dural violation is not “divorced” from a concrete harm, as each additional digit 
revealed can statistically increase the risk of identity theft in a dramatic fash-
                                                                                                                           
 94 See Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 116 (3d Cir. 2019) (affirming the lower court’s 
ruling even though the district court relied only on facts in the pleadings in a motion to dismiss); Katz, 
872 F.3d at 120–21 (acknowledging that the fact-finding procedure at the lower-court level was not as 
expansive as would be desired). 
 95 See Kamal, 918 F.3d 102 (lacking discussion on mathematical probabilities); Katz, 872 F.3d at 
114 (same); KENNETH ROSEN, DISCRETE MATHEMATICS AND ITS APPLICATIONS 370–71 (6th ed. 
2007) (explaining nk as the formula to calculate the possible permutations of a set (k) of elements (n) 
where repetition of elements is allowed and order of the elements matters); Jeff Stapleton & Ralph 
Spencer Poore, Tokenization and Other Methods of Security for Cardholder Data, 20 INFO. SECURITY 
J.: A GLOBAL PERSP. 91, 93–94 (discussing truncation as a tool for securing cardholder data). When 
unmasked, the possible permutations of credit card numbers from which a hacker must derive a valid 
entry for any one cardholder is 109, but this number decreases to 105 when properly truncated. See 
Stapleton & Poore, supra, at 93–94 (noting that, with a sixteen-digit card number, there are 109 possi-
ble permutations for a known card issuer); Rosen, supra, at 370–71 (providing a mathematical formu-
la for the possible number of permutations with five digits between zero to ten revealed). The plain-
tiffs in Kamal and Katz did not assert, and the courts therefore did not consider, that they are, at the 
very least, statistically more at risk to have a hacker correctly guess their full card numbers as a result 
of the defendants’ failure to properly truncate. See Kamal, 918 F.3d at 102 (lacking a discussion of 
statistical probabilities); Katz, 872 F.3d at 114 (same). 
 96 918 F.3d at 116–17. 
 97 872 F.3d. at 118, 120. The court was referring to Bank or Issuer Identification Numbers, which 
identify the credit card’s issuing bank. Id. at 118. 
 98 See 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (2018) (prohibiting merchants from printing no more than the last 
five digits of a consumer credit or debit card number); Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1188 (noting that in 
the truncation requirement, Congress created a rule setting the permissible behavior within a fixed 
parameter, and that the rule contains the definition of acceptable risk without reference to other factual 
circumstances). A per se rule creates standards, and their breach results in violations as a matter of law 
without accounting for other factual circumstances. Per se, Rule, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra 
note 12 (defining “per se” and “rule”). 
 99 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1). 
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ion.100 The bright-line rule in FACTA truncation cases stands in contrast to the 
FCRA violation at issue in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins (Spokeo).101 Defendants were 
only liable under the FCRA if they failed to have reasonable procedures in 
place ensuring consumer credit reports are as accurate as possible.102 There, 
Congress left the courts to decide whether any single procedural flaw, or com-
bination thereof, resulted in a risk of reputational harm to the consumer.103 The 
Eleventh Circuit recognized this distinction and deferred to congressional find-
ings that certain conduct exceeding prescribed limits results in risk great 
enough to confer standing.104 On rehearing, the court should similarly distin-
guish the bright-line rule at issue in Muransky II from the statutory provision at 
issue in Spokeo.105 
Since the opinion in Muransky II, district courts ruling consistently with 
the opinion have also fallen within the Eleventh Circuit’s jurisdiction.106 In the 
                                                                                                                           
 100 Compare Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (explaining that Robins would not have Article III stand-
ing if only alleging a procedural violation “divorced” from any concrete harms), with 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1681c(g)(1) (allowing merchants to print only the last five digits of a cardholder’s credit card num-
ber); Stapleton & Poore, supra at 95, at 93–94 (explaining the increase in statistical likelihood that 
hackers could arrive at correct full card numbers with each digit unmasked). 
 101 Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1681c(g)(1) (requiring merchants to publish no more than five digits of 
a consumer credit or debit card number), with id. § 1681e(b) (providing that consumer reporting agen-
cies must follow reasonable procedures to ensure maximum possible accuracy in their reporting). 
 102 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b); Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (citing the publication of incorrect zip codes 
to demonstrate an instance where a violation may not result in a sufficient degree of risk to confer 
Article III standing). The statutory provision at issue in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins does not impose strict 
liability. See 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (discussing Section 1681(e)(b) of the FCRA); Guimond v. Trans Un-
ion Credit Info. Co., 45 F.3d 1329, 1333 (9th Cir. 1995) (concluding that, because Section 1681(e)(b) 
of the FCRA requires courts to assess liability using a reasonableness standard, the provision does not 
impose strict liability). Errors alone do not constitute a violation if they are not misleading in a way 
that would potentially affect credit decisions when consumers seek loans. Shaw v. Experian Info. Sol., 
Inc. 891 F.3d 749, 756 (9th Cir. 2018). Similarly, a credit reporting agency will not be liable for inac-
curacies if it can demonstrate that the errors occurred despite following reasonable procedures. 
Guimond, 45 F.3d at 1333. The jury decides on questions of reasonableness. Id. 
 103 See Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1550 (noting that a violation of any one procedural requirement 
under the FCRA may result in no harm, and remanding the case to the lower court to determine 
whether the totality of errors and the circumstances in which the defendant committed them resulted 
in a risk of harm sufficiently elevated to confer standing). 
 104 See Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1189–90 (rejecting the conclusion in Katz that district courts can 
make factual findings on tolerable risk levels when Congress sets a uniform standard based on superi-
or empirical judgment). 
 105 See FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b) (2018) (requiring consumer reporting agencies to have rea-
sonable procedures to ensure consumer information is published accurately to the maximum extent 
possible); Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1545, 1549–50 (requiring the lower court to determine whether the 
defendant’s lack of procedural safeguards resulted in a risk of harm to the plaintiff’s reputation); Mu-
ransky II, 922 F.3d at 1189 (declining to interpret Spokeo to mean that lower courts may jettison uni-
form standards set by Congress when those standards are in conflict with their own findings of fact). 
 106 Compare Lawrence v. S. Racing Assoc., LLC, No. 18-cv-24264, 2019 WL 3890314, at *3 
(S.D. Fla. 2019) (concluding that, based on the reasoning in Muransky II, the plaintiff had standing to 
allege a violation of FACTA’s five-digit truncation requirement); Bailey v. Six Flags Entm’t Corp., 
No. 1:17-CV-3336-MHC, 2019 WL 3503732, at *3–4 (N.D. Ga. 2019) (same); Nowe v. Essex Tech. 
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sole federal appellate case outside of the circuit postdating Muranksy II, the 
court benefitted from factual distinctions, allowing it to avoid assessing risk 
entirely.107 In contrast, after Spokeo, plaintiffs brought five-digit truncation 
cases in three other circuit courts—the Second, Third, and Ninth Circuits—and 
each court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing.108 The opinion in Mu-
ransky II had been a rare departure.109 Indeed, the beginnings of a circuit split 
                                                                                                                           
Grp., LLC, No 1:18-CV-0623-MLB-JFK, 2018 WL 6720506, at *5 (N.D. Ga. 2018) (same), with 
Report and Recommendation at 5–6, Gennock v. Kirkland’s Inc., No. 17-454 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 
2019) (recommending dismissal of a case alleging a violation of the five-digit truncation requirement 
based on the reasoning in Kamal and adopting a district court’s opinion that follows the rationale in 
Katz). Muransky II is controlling precedent only for district courts within the Eleventh Circuit. See 
Colin Wrabley, Applying Federal Court of Appeals’ Precedent: Contrasting Approaches to Applying 
Court of Appeals’ Federal Law Holdings and Erie State Law Predictions, 3 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 1, 
1 (2006) (explaining that federal courts of appeals’ decisions on federal law are binding for district 
courts within their circuits, unless there are superseding statutes or decisions from a review en banc or 
the Supreme Court); see, e.g., Bailey, 2019 WL 3503732, at *3 (holding that, irrespective of what 
other circuit courts may have decided, the decision in Muransky was binding for the Bailey court). 
 107 See Jefferies v. Volume Servs. Am. Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1065–67 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (acknowl-
edging the reasoning in Muransky II and Kamal, but determining that the violation fell squarely within 
the definition of the FACTA truncation requirement because the merchant printed all sixteen digits of 
the plaintiff-cardholder’s credit card number). Decisions from other circuits are persuasive but not 
binding authority for circuit courts. THOMAS BAKER, A PRIMER ON THE JURISDICTION OF THE U.S. 
COURTS OF APPEALS 15 (2d ed. 2009) (providing an introductory exploration into subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the United States Courts of Appeals). A recent Illinois state court, however, found the 
reasoning in Muransky II persuasive and, with support from state-law jurisprudence, concluded that the 
plaintiff had standing to bring her FACTA claim. Duncan v. FedEx Office & Print Servs. Inc., 123 N.E. 
3d 1249, 1255 (Ill. App. 2019) (holding that the plaintiff suffered a concrete injury for the purposes of 
Article III standing). State courts are not bound by Article III constraints and are generally not as 
restrictive on issues of justiciability and standing. See id. at 1256 (discussing Illinois standing law); 
Soto v. Great Am. LLC, No. 17-cv-6902, 2018 WL 2364916, at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 24, 2018) (same). 
But requirements for standing in Illinois state law are similar to those in federal law, and state courts 
find federal law persuasive. See Duncan, 123 N.E.3d at 1255 (finding the reasoning from Muransky II 
persuasive); Maglio v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 40 N.E.3d 746, 753 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015) 
(explaining the position of Illinois courts on federal standing principals). Notably, the Illinois Su-
preme Court held that plaintiffs alleging injury to a statutory right do not need to meet any further 
requirements for standing. Glisson v. City of Marion, 70 N.E.2d 1034, 1040 (Ill. 1999). For the court, 
any test of standing that asked whether plaintiffs were the intended beneficiaries of the statutory pro-
tection unavoidably questioned the merits of the suit. Id. Questions of merit are impermissible consid-
erations for standing. Id. 
 108 See Kamal, 918 F.3d at 113, 119 (concluding that a plaintiff alleging that a retail store violated 
FACTA’s five-digit truncation requirement lacked standing because he did not show actual harm 
stemming from the violation nor sufficient risk of harm); Noble v. Nev. Checker Cab Corp., 726 F. 
App’x. 582, 583–84 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding that the plaintiff lacked standing because printing 
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 109 See Muransky II, 922 F.3d at 1192 (holding that Dr. Muransky suffered a concrete injury when 
a merchant violated FACTA by failing to truncate his credit card number on his point-of-sale receipt); 
supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing circuit court cases post-Spokeo wherein each court 
dismissed the plaintiff’s case for lack of standing); e.g., Noble, 726 F. App’x. at 583–84 (holding that 
the plaintiff’s suit could not survive dismissal because printing the first digit of a credit card number 
resulted in insufficient risk of harm). 
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likely gave impetus to the Eleventh Circuit’s subsequent decision to grant a 
rehearing en banc, and a desire to maintain national uniformity in FACTA 
truncation cases could be the original opinion’s ultimate undoing.110 
CONCLUSION 
In 2019, in Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., the Eleventh Circuit 
had held that plaintiffs had standing to sue when alleging a violation of FAC-
TA’s truncation requirements—a procedural right guarding against identity 
theft. The opinion was in keeping with the 2016 Supreme Court ruling in 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins whereby a procedural violation can result in a concrete 
harm to establish standing when the violation places plaintiffs in sufficient risk 
of harm. The Eleventh Circuit subsequently vacated its opinion and granted the 
appellants a rehearing en banc. Unlike its sister circuits, the court had initially 
chosen to defer to congressional findings that violations of FACTA’s trunca-
tion requirements exposed cardholders to an unacceptable risk of identity theft. 
The Eleventh Circuit had solid grounds to conclude that Congress is better po-
sitioned to develop an evidentiary foundation upon which to assess risk. There-
fore, despite any desire to avoid inter-circuit conflict, the court should rule 
consistently with its original decision. 
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